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PERSONALITY IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Political psychology “has a long past, but as an organized
discipline, it has a short history,” wrote William F. Stone in
The Psychology of Politics (Stone & Schaffner, 1988, p. v).
Niccolò Machiavelli’s political treatise, The Prince
(1513/1995), an early precursor of the ﬁeld, has modern-day
echoes in Richard Christie and Florence Geis’s Studies in
Machiavellianism (1970). The formal establishment of political psychology as an interdisciplinary scholarly endeavor
was anticipated by notable precursors in the twentieth century
with a focus on personality, among them Graham Wallas’s
Human Nature in Politics (1908); Harold Lasswell’s Psychopathology and Politics (1930) and Power and Personality
(1948); Hans Eysenck’s The Psychology of Politics (1954);
Fred Greenstein’s Personality and Politics (1969); and the
Handbook of Political Psychology (1973) edited by Jeanne
Knutson, who founded the International Society of Political
Psychology in 1978.
The purpose of this chapter is to sketch the rich history of
personality in political psychology, to take stock of the current state of personality-in-politics inquiry, and to map out
new directions for this emerging application of personality
theory informed by the rich possibilities of contextually adjacent scientiﬁc ﬁelds such as evolution, of which Theodore
Millon wrote in the opening chapter of this volume.

THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONALITY INQUIRY
IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
In the present chapter, the terms personality and politics are
employed in Greenstein’s (1992) narrowly construed sense.
Politics, by this deﬁnition, “refers to the politics most often
studied by political scientists—that of civil government and
of the extra-governmental processes that more or less directly
impinge upon government, such as political parties” and
campaigns. Personality, as narrowly construed in political
psychology, “excludes political attitudes and opinions . . . and
applies only to nonpolitical personal differences” (p. 107).
Origins of Personality-in-Politics Inquiry
Knutson’s 1973 Handbook, most notably the chapter “From
Where and Where To?” by James Davies, deﬁned the ﬁeld at
the time of its publication (Stone & Schaffner, 1988, p. v).
Davies (1973) credits political scientist Charles Merriam of
the University of Chicago with stimulating “the ﬁrst notable
liaisons between psychology and political science” (p. 18) in
the 1920s and 1930s. Though Merriam did not personally

exploit the fruitful possibilities he saw for a productive union
of the two disciplines, his “intellectual progeny,” Harold
Lasswell, “was the ﬁrst to enter boldly into the psychological
house of ill repute, establish a liaison, and sire a set of ideas
and inﬂuences of great vitality” (p. 18).
Machiavelli’s famous treatise serves as testimony that,
from the beginning, the study of personality in politics constituted an integral part of political-psychological inquiry. In the
modern era, the tradition dates back to Sigmund Freud, who
collaborated with William Bullitt on a psychological study of
U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (Freud & Bullitt, 1967).
Types of Personality-in-Politics Inquiry
In examining the state of the personality-in-politics literature, Greenstein (1969) proposed three types of personalityin-politics inquiry: individual, typological, and aggregate.
Individual inquiry (Greenstein, 1969, pp. 63–93), which is
idiographic in orientation, involves single-case psychological
analyses of individual political actors. Although the singlecase literature historically comprised mostly psychological
biographies of public ﬁgures, such as Alexander and Juliette
George’s Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (1956) and
Erik Erikson’s Gandhi’s Truth (1969), it also encompassed
in-depth studies of members of the general population, such
as Robert Lane’s Political Ideology (1962). With increasing
specialization in political psychology since the 1960s, the
focus has shifted progressively to the psychological examination of political leaders, while single-case studies of ordinary
citizens have become increasingly peripheral to the main
focus of contemporary political personality research.
Typological inquiry (Greenstein, 1969, pp. 94–119),
which is nomothetic in orientation, concerns multicase analyses of political actors. This line of inquiry encompasses the
main body of work in political personality, including the inﬂuential work of Harold Lasswell (1930, 1948), James David
Barber (1965, 1972/1992), Margaret Hermann (1974, 1980,
1986, 1987), and David Winter (1987, 1998) with respect to
high-level political leaders; however, part of this literature
focuses more on followers (i.e., mass politics) than on leaders
(i.e., elite politics)—for example, Theodor Adorno, Else
Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford’s
classic The Authoritarian Personality (1950) and Milton
Rokeach’s The Open and Closed Mind (1960). Greenstein
(1992) has submitted that typological study “is of potentially
great importance: if political actors fall into types with known
characteristics and propensities, the laborious task of analyzing them de novo can be obviated, and uncertainty is reduced
about how they will perform in particular circumstances”
(p. 120).
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Aggregate inquiry (Greenstein, 1969, pp. 120–140) includes a large and diverse body of work on national character, conﬂict among nations, behavior in groups, and global
psychologizing about humanity and society (pp. 15–16).
Greenstein (1992) has written that the impact of mass publics
on politics, except for elections and drastic shifts in public
opinion, “is partial and often elusive,” in contrast to the
political impact of leaders, which tends to be “direct, readily
evident, and potentially momentous in its repercussions”
(p. 122).
In his review of “Personality and Politics” in the Handbook of Personality (Pervin, 1990), Dean Keith Simonton
(1990) observed that the psychometric examination of political leaders represents the leading edge of current personalityin-politics research (p. 671). Moreover, by 1990 the dominant
paradigm in the psychological examination of leaders had
undergone a shift from the earlier preponderance of qualitative, idiographic, psychobiographic analysis, to more quantitative and nomothetic methods—in other words, Greenstein’s
(1969) typological inquiry. Simonton’s assessment is as
valid now as it was more than a decade ago. Contemporary
personality-in-politics inquiry focuses almost exclusively on
the psychological examination of high-level political leaders
and the impact of personal characteristics on leadership performance and policy orientation.
Its other principal avenue of inquiry, the study of ordinary
citizens, has retreated from the political personality landscape,
although it left a legacy of momentous works such as Adorno
et al. (1950), Rokeach (1960), and others. As Simonton (1990)
has noted, “the heyday of personality studies conducted on the
typical citizen is past; the personality traits germane to citizen
ideology and candidate preferences have been inventoried
many times” (p. 671). This trend represents a distinct shift
from the personality-and-culture era of the 1940s and 1950s
(McGuire, 1993), in which psychobiography, studies of
national character, and research involving the authoritarian
personality syndrome ﬂourished (Levin, 2000, p. 605). In this
regard, Greenstein (1992) pointed to “the vexed post–World
War II national character literature in which often illdocumented ethnographic reports and cultural artifacts . . .
were used to draw sweeping conclusions about modal national
character traits,” with the result that by the 1950s, “there was
broad scholarly consensus that it is inappropriate simply to
attribute psychological characteristics to mass populations on
the basis of anecdotal or indirect evidence” (p. 122). Accordingly, political personality inquiry became more leadership
oriented in emphasis, with the study of followers (or mass
publics) in the domain of political psychology increasingly
shifting to cognate areas such as political socialization,
political attitudes, prejudice and intergroup conﬂict, political
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participation, party identiﬁcation, voting behavior, and public
opinion, which could be studied more systematically than the
impalpable notion of national character.

THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONALITY INQUIRY
IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Political psychology, as much as any social-scientiﬁc endeavor, has evolved in sociohistoric context. Accordingly, the
evolution of personality-in-politics inquiry in the second half
of the twentieth century can be viewed against the backdrop
of three deﬁning events: the legacy of the Nazi Holocaust and
World War II; the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation; and the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, with its attendant new world
order.
The Postwar Era
The rise of Hitler and the Nazi Holocaust stimulated personality research in the areas of authoritarianism, belief systems,
and ideology, as represented in the work of Adorno et al.
(1950) and Rokeach (1960), noted previously—precisely the
historical juncture that in the domain of social psychology
stimulated vigorous research programs in conformity (e.g.,
Asch, 1955) and obedience (e.g., Milgram, 1963).
In a deﬁnitive 1973 review of research developments in
political psychology since Lasswell (1951), Davies identiﬁed
four distinct lines of inquiry in post–World War II political
psychology: (a) the study of voting behavior in stable democracies, the dominant trend, which had become “increasingly
dull, repetitious, and a precious picking of nits”; (b) crossnational comparative research in relatively stable, democratic
polities (which included “the vexed post–World War II
national character literature” noted by Greenstein, 1992,
(p. 122); (c) the genesis of behavioral patterns established in
childhood (i.e., political socialization), which, along with
cross-national research, “provided some relief from the
[dominant trend’s] rather static study of behavior under stable
circumstances”; and (d) psychological political biography
(p. 21). Concerning the latter, which is most closely allied to
contemporary political personality inquiry, Davies (1973)
noted the futility of attempting to ascertain the psychological
determinants of why some individuals emerge as leaders,
given the rudimentary nature of available conceptual tools
and measuring devices. More useful, according to Davies,
would be analysis and description of leadership style, which
had become increasingly sophisticated, as evidenced by
the work of Barber (1972–1992)—“the boldest step yet in
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establishing a typology applicable to all American presidents,” successfully making a case for “the predictability
of. . . . how presidents will act” (Davies, 1973, p. 25).
The Cold War Era
By the 1960s, the Cold War, punctuated by the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, brought about an important shift in the direction of political personality research. In the shadow of the
nuclear sword, the focus of interest shifted from the mass
politics of followers to the elite politics of foreign-policy
decision making. In social psychology, this trend was paralleled by research endeavors such as Charles Osgood’s (1962)
explication of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction
(GRIT) and Irving Janis’s (1972/1982; Janis & Mann, 1977)
inﬂuential work on groupthink and decision-making ﬁascoes.
In his review of advances in the study of personality and
politics, Greenstein (1992) noted that the 1970s and 1980s
were marked by “burgeoning inquiry into political perception
and cognitive psychology more generally” (p. 112), as represented by Robert Jervis’s (1976) text on threat perception and
deterrence and Richard Lau and David Sears’s (1986) edited
collection of papers on political cognition.
As a ﬁeld, political psychology thrived in the sociohistoric
environment of the Cold War, as witnessed by the publication
of the Handbook of Political Psychology in 1973, with an
important chapter on “Personality in the Study of Politics” by
its editor, Jeanne Knutson; William F. Stone’s (1974) groundbreaking introductory political psychology textbook; and the
founding of the International Society of Political Psychology
in 1978. Greenstein, in his now classic Personality and Politics (1969), set about the task of clearing a path “through the
tangle of intellectual underbrush” (Greenstein, 1987, p. v) of
conﬂicting perspectives on whether personality in politics
was amenable to, and worthy of, disciplined inquiry.
Well into the 1980s, however, three powerful inﬂuences
would subdue the impact of Greenstein’s (1969) and Knutson’s
(1973) important work in mapping out a conceptual framework conferring ﬁgural status upon the personality construct in
the evolving study of personality in politics: the dominant interest in foreign-policy decision making against the backdrop
of the Soviet-U.S. struggle for superpower supremacy; the
cognitive revolution (see McGraw, 2000; Simon, 1985), which
extended its reach from its parent discipline of psychology into
mainstream political science; and the person–situation debate
(see Mischel, 1990) then raging in personality psychology.
In a preface to the new edition (1987) of Personality and
Politics, Greenstein observed that “one kind of political
psychology—the cognitive psychology of perception and
misperception—has found a respected niche in a political

science ﬁeld, namely international relations” (p. vi). Ole
Holsti (1989) asserted that the psychological perspective
constituted a basic necessity in the study of international
politics. As the 1980s drew to a close, Jervis (1989), in a
paper outlining major challenges to the ﬁeld of political psychology, wrote, “The study of individual personalities and
personality types has fallen out of favor in psychology and
political science, but this does not mean the topics are
unimportant” (p. 491). Signiﬁcantly, two decades earlier
George (1969) and Holsti (1970) had published inﬂuential
papers that revived the World War II–era operational code
construct, in part because perception and beliefs were viewed
as more easily inferred than personality—given “the kinds of
data, observational opportunities, and methods generally
available to political scientists” (George, 1969, p. 195).
The renewed focus on operational codes—beliefs about
the fundamental nature of politics, which shape one’s worldview, and hence, one’s choice of political objectives—steered
political personality in a distinctly cognitive direction.
Stephen Walker (1990, 2000) and his associates (Dille &
Young, 2000; Schafer, 2000) would carry this line of inquiry
forward to the present day. Moreover, Hermann (1974)
initiated a research agenda that accorded cognitive variables
a prominent role in the study of political personality.
Hermann’s (1980) conceptual scheme accommodated four
kinds of personal characteristics hypothesized to play a central role in political behavior: beliefs and motives, which
shape a leader’s view of the world, and decision style and
interpersonal style, which shape the leader’s personal
political style. Hermann’s model warrants particular attention
because of the degree to which it integrated existing perspectives at the time, and because of its enduring inﬂuence on the
study of personality in politics.
Conceptually, Hermann’s notion of beliefs is anchored to
the philosophical beliefs component of the operational code
construct. Her interest in motives stems from Lasswell’s
Power and Personality (1948) and Winter’s The Power
Motive (1973)—an approach to political personality that
Winter (1991) would elaborate into a major political personality assessment methodology in its own right. Hermann’s
construal of decision style overlaps with the instrumental beliefs component of George’s (1969) operational code construct and aspects of Barber’s (1972/1992) formulation of
presidential character, focusing particularly on conceptual
complexity (see Dille & Young, 2000)—once again, an approach to political personality that would later develop
into a major branch of political personality assessment, as
represented in the work of Suedfeld (1994) on integrative
complexity. Finally, Hermann’s interpersonal style domain
encompasses a number of politically relevant personality
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traits such as suspiciousness, Machiavellianism, and task
versus relationship orientation in leadership (see Hermann,
1980, pp. 8–10).
Methodologically, a common strand of cognitively and
motivationally oriented trait approaches—such as those of
Hermann (1987), Suedfeld (1994), Walker (1990), and
Winter (1998)—is their reliance on content analysis of public
documents (typically speeches and other prepared remarks or
interviews and spontaneous remarks) for the indirect assessment of political personality (see Schafer, 2000, for a recent
overview of issues in at-a-distance methods of psychological
assessment).
As Simonton (1990) has noted, “The attributes of character that leave the biggest impression on political affairs involve both cognitive inclinations, which govern how an
individual perceives and thinks about the world, and motivational dispositions, which energize and channel individual
actions in the world” (pp. 671–672). Hermann’s model, in
capturing cognition (including beliefs or attitudes) and motivation (recognizing the importance of affect in politics and
checking the tendency in political psychology toward
overemphasis of human rationality), clearly ﬁlls Simonton’s
prescription. On the other hand, Hermann’s construal of decision style as a personality (or input) variable is problematic.
Renshon’s (1996b) integrative theory of character and political performance, for example, speciﬁes political and policy
judgments and decision making, along with leadership, as
performance (output) variables. Finally, Hermann’s construal
of personality in terms of interpersonal style is too restrictive
for a comprehensive theory of personality in politics.
The New World Order
Epochal events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the
collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe
in 1989–1990, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1991–1992, South Africa’s transition from apartheid state to
nonracial democracy in 1994 following Nelson Mandela’s
release from prison in 1990, and the Persian Gulf War in 1991
marked the beginning of a new world order, which stimulated
renewed research interest in psychometric inquiry—an area
that contemporaneously began to emerge as a new paradigm
for the study of personality in politics (Immelman, 1988,
1993; Simonton, 1990). In psychometric personality-inpolitics inquiry, standard psychometric instruments were
adapted to “derive personality measures from biographical
data rather than through content analysis of primary materials”
(Simonton, 1990, p. 678), although some investigators (e.g.,
Kowert, 1996; Rubenzer, Faschingbauer, & Ones, 2002),
though similar in intent, opted for indirect expert ratings
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instead of direct analysis of biographical data. The focus of
psychometric inquiry is less on cognitive variables and
foreign-policy decision making and more on a personological
understanding of the person in politics, his or her personality
attributes, and the implications of personality for leadership
performance and generalized policy orientation.
George and George’s (1956) psychoanalytically framed
study of Woodrow Wilson, which relied on clinical insights
rather than psychometric evaluation of biographical data, is
the best known precursor of the personological trend in political personality research. In Simonton’s (1990) judgment,
qualitative, nonpsychometric psychobiographical analyses
“have leaned heavily on both theoretical perspectives and
methodological approaches that cannot be considered a central current in mainstream personality research” (p. 671). Although some highly informative personological studies (e.g.,
Glad, 1996; Post, 1991; Renshon, 1996a, 1998) continued in
the older psychobiographic tradition, the twentieth century
closed with a distinct shift in a psychometric direction (Immelman, 1998, 2002; Kowert, 1996; Lyons, 1997; Rubenzer
et al., 2002).
Although some contemporary psychobiographically oriented studies are theoretically eclectic (e.g., Betty Glad’s
1996 study of the transfer of power from Gorbachev to
Yeltsin in Russia and from De Klerk to Mandela in South
Africa), the modern psychoanalytic reformulations of Heinz
Kohut (1971, 1977) and Otto Kernberg (1984) have acquired
considerable cachet in political psychology. Swansbrough
(1994), for instance, conducted a Kohutian analysis of
George Bush’s personality and leadership style in the Persian
Gulf war. Similarly, Stanley Renshon’s (1996a) psychobiography of Bill Clinton is informed primarily by Kohutian self
psychology. Jerrold Post’s (1991) psychobiographical analysis of Saddam Hussein is more indebted to Kernberg’s notion
of narcissistic personality organization (see Post, 1993).
Despite Simonton’s (1990) grim prognostication and Jervis’s
(1989) observation that “Freudian analysis and psychobiographies are out of fashion” (p. 482), the psychobiographic
tradition has been revitalized by the analytic insights of
scholars such as Post and Renshon.

OBSTACLES TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
PERSONALITY-IN-POLITICS ENTERPRISE
Greenstein (1992) has formulated what may be the most concise statement of the case for studying personality in politics:
“Political institutions and processes operate through human
agency. It would be remarkable if they were not inﬂuenced by
the properties that distinguish one individual from another”
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(p. 124). Yet, specialists in the study of politics “tend to concentrate on impersonal determinants of political events and
outcomes” or deﬁne away personal characteristics, “positing
rationality . . . and presuming that the behavior of actors can
be deduced from the logic of their situation” (p. 106). The
relevance of the study of personality with respect to political
leadership is nicely captured in Renshon’s (1996b) contention that
many of the most important aspects of presidential performance
rely on the personal characteristics and skills of the president. . . .
It is his views, his goals, his bargaining skills . . . , his judgments,
his choices of response to arising circumstance that set the levers
of administrative, constitutional, and institutional structures into
motion. (p. 7)

In this regard, Glad (1996), writing about the collapse of the
communist state in the Soviet Union and the apartheid state
in South Africa, has shown convincingly that the personal
qualities of leaders can play a critical role at turning points in
history.
Scholarly Skepticism and Inadequate Conceptual
and Methodological Tools
Despite the conviction of personality-in-politics practitioners
in the worth of their endeavor, the study of personality in politics is not without controversy (see Lyons, 1997, pp. 792–
793, for a concise review of “controversies over the presidential personality approach”). Greenstein (1969, pp. 33–62)
offered an incisive critique of “two erroneous” and “three
partially correct” objections to the study of personality in politics, lamenting that the study of personality in politics was
“not a thriving scholarly endeavor,” principally because
“scholars who study politics do not feel equipped to analyze
personality in ways that meet their intellectual standards. . . .
[thus rendering it primarily] the preserve of journalists”
(p. 2). The optimistic verdict more than three decades later is
that political personality has taken root and come of age as a
scholarly endeavor, as evidenced by the inclusion of the
present chapter in this volume.
Inadequate Transposition From Source to
Target Discipline
Although the enterprise of studying personality in politics
has largely succeeded in countering common objections to its
usefulness, it has been hampered by inadequate transposition
from the source discipline of personality assessment to the
target discipline of political psychology. For political personality inquiry to remain a thriving scholarly endeavor and

have an impact beyond the narrow conﬁnes of academic
political psychology, it will need to account, at a minimum,
for the patterning of personality variables “across the entire
matrix of the person” (Millon & Davis, 2000, pp. 2, 65). Only
then will political personality assessment provide an adequate basis for explaining, predicting, and understanding
political outcomes. Moreover, political personologists will
need to advance an integrative theory, not only of personality
and of political leadership, but also of the personality-politics
nexus. In The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates (1996b), Stanley Renshon provides a partial blueprint
for this daunting task.
Inadequate Progress From Description of Observable
Phenomena to Theoretical Systematization
Ultimately, scholarly progress in personality-in-politics inquiry hinges on its success in advancing from the “natural
history stage of inquiry” to a “stage of deductively formulated theory” (Northrop, 1947). The intuitive psychologist’s
“ability to ‘sense’ the correctness of psychological insight”
(chapter by Millon in this volume) presents an easily overlooked obstacle to progress in political-personological inquiry. Early in the development of a scientiﬁc discipline,
according to philosopher of science Carl Hempel (1965), investigators primarily strive “to describe the phenomena
under study and to establish simple empirical generalizations
concerning them,” using terms that “permit the description of
those aspects of the subject matter which are ascertainable
fairly directly by observation” (p. 140). Hermann’s (1974,
1980) early work illustrates this initial stage of scientiﬁc
development. In the words of Hempel (1965),
The shift toward theoretical systematization is marked by the introduction of new, “theoretical” terms, which refer to various
theoretically postulated entities, their characteristics, and the
processes in which they are involved; all of these are more or
less removed from the level of directly observable things and
events. (p. 140)

Hermann’s (1987) proposal of a model suggesting how leaders’ observable personal characteristics “link to form role
orientations to foreign affairs” (p. 162) represents considerable progress in this direction; however, it lacks systematic
import.

A Lack of Systematic Import
Theoretical systematization and empirical import (operational deﬁnitions) are necessary but not sufﬁcient for
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scientiﬁc progress.
To be scientiﬁcally useful a concept must lend itself to the formulation of general laws or theoretical principles which reﬂect
uniformities in the subject matter under study, and which thus
provide a basis for explanation, prediction, and generally scientiﬁc understanding. (Hempel, 1965, p. 146)

The most striking instance of this principle of systematic
import, according to Hempel (1965), “is the periodic system
of the elements, on which Mendeleev based a set of highly
speciﬁc predictions, which were impressively conﬁrmed
by subsequent research” (p. 147). Hempel chronicled similar
scientiﬁc progress in biological taxonomic systems, which
proceeded from primitive classiﬁcation based on observable
characteristics to a more advanced phylogenetic-evolutionary
basis. Thus, “two phenomenally very similar specimens may
be assigned to species far removed from each other in the
evolutionary hierarchy, such as the species Wolf (Canis) and
Tasmanian Wolf (Thylacinus)” (Hempel, 1965, p. 149).
For personality-in-politics inquiry to continue advancing
as a scholarly discipline, it will have to come to grips with the
canon of systematic import. At base, this means that theoretical systematizations cannot be constructed on the foundation
of precisely those personal characteristics from which they
were originally inferred (see chapter by Millon in this volume). As Kurt Gödel (1931) demonstrated with his incompleteness theorem, no self-contained system can prove or
disprove its own propositions while operating within the
axioms of that system.

TOWARD A GENERATIVE THEORY
OF PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL
PERFORMANCE
Ideally, conceptual systems for the study of political personality should constitute a comprehensive, generative, theoretically coherent framework consonant with established
principles in the adjacent sciences (particularly the more
mature natural sciences; see Millon’s chapter in this volume),
congenial with respect to accommodating a diversity of
politically relevant personal characteristics, and capable of
reliably predicting meaningful political outcomes. In this
regard, Renshon (1996b) is critical of unitary trait theories
of political personality (such as those relying primarily on
isolated personality variables, motives, or cognitive variables), noting that “it is a long causal way from an individual
trait of presidential personality to a speciﬁc performance outcome” and that unitary trait theories fail to contribute to the
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development of an integrated psychological theory of leadership performance. He ventures that “more clinically based
theories . . . might form the basis of a more comprehensive
psychological model of presidential performance” (p. 11).
The problem bedeviling contemporary personality-inpolitics inquiry, however, is more profound than the precarious perch of leadership performance theories on a fragmented
personological foundation. In his critique of postwar research
directions in political psychology, Davies (1973) declared:
There is . . . a kind of atrophy of theory and research that can help
us link observable acts with their deeply and generally antecedent causes in the human organism, notably the nervous and
endocrine systems. Aristotle sought such relationships. So did
Hobbes, whose Leviathan (1651) founded its analysis of political institutions on a theory of human nature. And likewise,
Lasswell has sought to relate fundamental determinants to
observable effects—and vice versa. (p. 26)

Similarly, but with greater theoretical precision, Millon
(1990), in explicating his evolutionary theory of personality,
distinguished between “true, theoretically deduced” nosologies and those that provide “a mere explanatory summary of
known observations and inferences” (p. 105). He cited Hempel
(1965), who proposed that scientiﬁc classiﬁcation ought to
have an “objective existence in nature, . . . ‘carving nature at the
joints,’ in contradistinction to ‘artiﬁcial’ classiﬁcations, in
which the deﬁning characteristics have few explanatory or
predictive connections with other traits” (p. 147). Ultimately,
“in the course of scientiﬁc development, classiﬁcations deﬁned
by reference to manifest, observable characteristics will tend to
give way to systems based on theoretical concepts” (Hempel,
1965, pp. 148–149).
Greenstein (1987), pointing to the work of Gangestad and
Snyder (1985) and Morey (1985), acknowledged the substantial progress since the publication of his seminal Personality
and Politics (1969) “in grounding complex psychological
typologies empirically,” yet pessimistically proclaimed that
“complex typologies are not easily constructed and documented” (Greenstein, 1987, p. xiv). Although Greenstein was
clearly correct on both counts, he failed to report that these
typologies had already been constructed and empirically
documented (see, for example, Millon, 1986). Greenstein’s
(1987) conclusion, that the difﬁculty of constructing a complex typology renders it “productive to classify political
actors in terms of single traits that differentiate them in
illuminating ways” (p. xiv), is therefore patently founded
on a false premise. This pitfall of overlooking parallel developments in clinical science is reminiscent of Barber’s
(1972/1992) construction, de novo, of a rudimentary 2 × 2
model for assessing presidential character, which yields little
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more systematic import or prototypal distinctiveness than the
humoral doctrine of Hippocrates, 24 centuries earlier.
Toward a Politically Relevant Theory
of Personality in Politics
Renshon (1996b) has argued persuasively that a president’s
character serves as the foundation for leadership effectiveness, in part because political parties (in the United States)
have lost much of their ability to serve as “ﬁlters” for evaluating candidates, who are no longer mere standard-bearers of
party platforms and ideologies (pp. 38–40). Renshon examines the psychology of presidential candidates using theories
of character and personality, theories of presidential leadership and performance, and theories of public psychology. For
a concise, schematic outline of Renshon’s model, which is
anchored to Kohut’s (1971, 1977) psychoanalytic self theory,
the reader is referred to appendix 2 (pp. 409–411) of his
book, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates (1996b).
For the great majority of psychodiagnosticians, who are
more familiar with Axis II of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV) of the
American Psychiatric Association (APA; 1994) than with
Kohutian self psychology as a framework for recording personality functioning, Renshon’s (1996b) particular clinically
based theory of political personality may be somewhat
restrictive, if not arcane. Fortunately, the value of Renshon’s
work with respect to mapping out an integrated theory of character and leadership for political personality assessment is not
contingent upon the utility of the personological component
of his model; it can easily be molded to the theoretical proclivities of the practitioner, including—perhaps especially—
those favoring a theoretical orientation more compatible with
the DSM-IV.
Toward a Psychologically Grounded Theory of
Political Performance
In developing a psychologically grounded theory of political
performance, Renshon (1996b) distinguished between two
key elements of presidential role performance: “making good
policy and political decisions” and “pursuing and realizing
policy purposes” (p. 12). With regard to the former, Renshon
(1996b) proposed a model of judgment and decision making
(pp. 206–223, 411) capable of accommodating those cognitive constructs that became popular in Cold War–era political
psychology (e.g., integrative complexity). Concerning the
second aspect of political performance, Renshon (1996b) proposes “three distinct aspects” (p. 226) of political leadership

shaped by character: mobilization, the ability to arouse, engage, and direct the public; orchestration, the organizational
skill and ability to craft speciﬁc policies; and consolidation,
the skills and tasks required to preserve the supportive relationships necessary for implementing and institutionalizing
one’s policy judgments (pp. 227, 411).
However, those seeking to develop a generative theory of
personality and political performance confront a conceptual
mineﬁeld—a problem highlighted previously with respect to
the overly restrictive, psychodynamically framed character
component of Renshon’s model, which limits its integrative
potential. This issue is examined more closely in the next
section.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF
PERSONALITY IN POLITICS
Unresolved conceptual problems that cloud personality-inpolitics inquiry include a lack of agreement about the appropriate levels of analysis; a lack of clarity about the requisite
scope of inquiry; theoretical stagnation; and a failure of some
approaches to satisfy basic standards for operationalizing
the personality construct.

Levels of Analysis
In his early efforts to chart a course for the ﬁeld’s development, Greenstein (1969) noted that the personality-in-politics
literature was “formidably gnarled—empirically, methodologically, and conceptually” (p. 2). He identiﬁed three operational levels for the assessment of personality in politics:
phenomenology, dynamics, and genesis. In Greenstein’s
opinion, these distinctions are useful
for sorting out the different kinds of operations involved in the
psychological diagnosis of political actors, and for ordering
diagnostic operations in terms of both the directness of their
bearing on explanations of political action and the degree to
which they can be carried out in a more or less standardized
fashion. (p. 144)

Phenomenology—regularities in the observable behavior
of political actors—according to Greenstein, is “the most immediately relevant supplement to situational data in predicting and explaining the actor’s behavior” (p. 144), whereas
explanations of genesis are “remote from the immediate
nexus of behavior” and pose “difﬁcult questions of validation” (p. 145). With the increasing dominance of descriptive
approaches and the dwindling inﬂuence of psychoanalysis in
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contemporary personality assessment (Jervis, 1989, p. 482;
Simonton, 1990, p. 671), preoccupation with personality
dynamics can be expected to wane, while psychogenesis
already occupies a peripheral role in political personality, of
primary interest to psychohistorians.
Millon’s (1990) evolutionary model reﬁnes Greenstein’s
three operational levels of analysis (phenomenology, dynamics, and genesis) by redeﬁning genesis as a conceptual
construct, relabeling dynamics as the intrapsychic level of
analysis, disaggregating phenomenology into phenomenological and behavioral data levels, and adding a fourth,
biophysical, data level.
The critical operational constructs are the clinical domains
(or personality attributes), which provide an explicit basis for
personality assessment. Millon’s (1990) evolutionary model
speciﬁes four structural domains (object representations,
self-image, morphologic organization, and mood or temperament) and four functional domains (expressive behavior,
interpersonal conduct, cognitive style, and regulatory mechanisms) encompassing four data levels: behavioral (expressive
behavior, interpersonal conduct); phenomenological (cognitive style, object representations, self-image); intrapsychic
(regulatory mechanisms, morphological organization); and
biophysical (mood or temperament).
Scope of Inquiry
Beyond simply reﬁning Greenstein’s (1969) speciﬁcation of
operational levels for personality-in-politics inquiry, the
scope of this endeavor must be elucidated if political personality is to extricate itself from the “tangled underbrush.” The
requisite scope of inquiry is implied in the organizational
framework of a representative undergraduate personality text
(Pervin & John, 2001), which presents theory and research in
terms of structure, process, development, psychopathology,
and change—a formulation consistent with the organizing
framework of structure, dynamics, development, assessment,
and change that Gordon Allport employed in his seminal text,
Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (1937). Millon’s
(1990, 1996) contemporary clinical model of personality follows this time-honored tradition by construing personality in
terms of its structural and functional domains, normal and
pathological variants, developmental background (including
hypothesized biogenic factors and characteristic developmental history), homeostatic (self-perpetuation) processes,
and domain-based modiﬁcation strategies and tactics.
Theoretical Orientation
In an important recapitulation nearly a quarter-century after
his landmark work in Personality and Politics (1969),
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Greenstein (1992) resolved, “The study of personality and
politics is possible and desirable, but systematic intellectual
progress is possible only if there is careful attention to problems of evidence, inference, and conceptualization” (p. 105).
He went on to assert, however, that “it is not appropriate to
recommend a particular personality theory,” suggesting that
the theories of “Freud, Jung, Allport, Murray, and . . . many
others” (p. 117) are all potentially useful. Although there is
merit in Greenstein’s (1973) counsel to “let many ﬂowers
bloom” (p. 469), professional psychodiagnosticians—who
tend not to treat the classic schools of personality theory as
templates for tailoring their assessment tools—might ﬁnd
this assertion quite striking. Burgeoning scientiﬁc and technological progress in clinical science over the past halfcentury practically dictates that assimilating contemporary
approaches to psychodiagnostics and personality assessment
provides a less obstacle strewn passage for personality-inpolitics practitioners than steering a course illuminated solely
by the radiance of the great pioneers of personality theory.
Despite major advances in behavioral neuroscience, evolutionary ecology, and personality research in the past two
decades (see chapter by Millon in this volume), personalityin-politics inquiry arguably has become insular and stagnant,
with few fresh ideas and—with the exception of cognitive
science—little indication of meaningful cross-pollination of
ideas from adjacent disciplines.
Necessary Conditions for Operationalizing
Research Designs
In the original Handbook of Political Psychology (1973),
Knutson implored that, to be feasible for studying personality
in politics, conceptual models should fulﬁll three critical requirements for operationalizing research designs in political
personality: Clearly conceptualize the meaning of the term
personality; delineate attributes of personality that can be
quantiﬁed or objectively assessed, thereby rendering them
amenable to scientiﬁc study; and specify how the personality
attributes subjected to scientiﬁc inquiry relate to the personality construct (pp. 34–35). As shown next, Millon’s
(1990, 1996) evolutionary model of personality satisﬁes all
three of Knutson’s criteria, making it eminently useful for
studying personality in politics.
Deﬁning Personality
From Millon’s evolutionary-ecological perspective, personality constitutes ontogenetic, manifest, adaptive styles of
thinking, feeling, acting, and relating to others, shaped by
interaction of latent, phylogenetic, biologic endowment and
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social experience (chapter by Millon in this volume). This
construal is consistent with the contemporary view of personality as
a complex pattern of deeply embedded psychological characteristics that are largely nonconscious and not easily altered,
expressing themselves automatically in almost every facet of
functioning. Intrinsic and pervasive, these traits emerge from a
complicated matrix of biological dispositions and experiential
learnings, and ultimately comprise the individual’s distinctive
pattern of perceiving, feeling, thinking, coping, and behaving.
(Millon, 1996, p. 4)

Delineating the Core Attributes of Personality
In constructing an integrated personality framework that accounts for “the patterning of characteristics across the entire
matrix of the person” (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 2), Millon
(1994b) favors a theoretically grounded “prototypal domain
model” (p. 292) that combines quantitative dimensional
elements (e.g., the ﬁve-factor approach) with a qualitative
categorical approach (e.g., DSM-IV). The categorical aspect
of Millon’s model is represented by eight universal attribute
domains relevant to all personality patterns, namely expressive behavior, interpersonal conduct, cognitive style, mood
or temperament, self-image, regulatory mechanisms, object
representations, and morphologic organization.
Assessing Personality on the Basis of Variability
Across Attributes
Millon speciﬁes prototypal features (diagnostic criteria)
within each of the eight attribute domains for each personality style (Millon, 1994a; Millon & Everly, 1985) or disorder
(1990, 1996) accommodated in his taxonomy. The dimensional aspect of Millon’s schema is achieved by evaluating
the “prominence or pervasiveness” (1994b, p. 292) of the
diagnostic criteria associated with the various personality
types.
Additional Considerations
Traditionally, political personality assessment has borne little
resemblance to the conceptualization of personality shared by
most clinically trained professional psychodiagnosticians, or
to their psychodiagnostic procedures. In satisfying Knutson’s
three criteria, Millon’s personological model offers a viable
integrative framework for a variety of current approaches to
political personality, thus narrowing conceptual and methodological gaps between existing formulations in the source disciplines of personology and personality assessment and the

target discipline of contemporary political personality—
speciﬁcally the psychological examination of political
leaders.
Although necessary for operationalizing research designs,
Knutson’s (1973) three criteria provide an insufﬁcient basis
for applied personality-in-politics modeling. A theoretically
sound, comprehensive, useful personality-in-politics model
with adequate explanatory power and predictive utility must
meet additional standards. I propose the following basic standards for personality-in-politics modeling:
1. The meaning of the term personality should be clearly
deﬁned.
2. Quantiﬁable personality attributes amenable to objective
assessment should be clearly speciﬁed.
3. The personality attributes subject to inquiry should be
explicitly related to the personality construct as whole.
4. The conceptual model for construing personality in
politics should be congruent with personality systems
employed with reference to the general population.
5. The conceptual model for construing political personality should be integrative, capable of accommodating
diverse, multidisciplinary perspectives on politically
relevant personal characteristics.
6. The conceptual model should offer a uniﬁed view of
normality and psychopathology.
7. The conceptual model should be rooted in personality
theory, with clearly speciﬁed referents in political leadership theory.
8. The personality-in-politics model should be embedded
in a larger conceptual framework that acknowledges
cultural contexts and the impact of distal and proximal
situational determinants that interact with dispositional
variables to shape political behavior.
9. The methodology for assessing political personality
should be congruent with standard psychodiagnostic
procedures in conventional clinical practice.
10. The assessment methodology should be inferentially
valid.
11. The assessment methodology should meet acceptable
standards of evidence for reliability.
12. For purposes of predictive utility, the assessment
methodology should be practicable during political
campaigns.
13. For considerations of efﬁciency, the assessment methodology should be minimally cumbersome or unwieldy.
14. For optimal utility, the assessment methodology should
be remote, indirect, unobtrusive, and nonintrusive.
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15. For advancing theoretical systematization, the conceptual model should be nomothetically oriented, permit
typological inquiry, and posit a taxonomy of political
personality types.
A PERSONALITY-IN-POLITICS AGENDA
FOR THE NEW CENTURY
In the new world order of the twenty-ﬁrst century, personality-in-politics inquiry is poised to reclaim personality as the
central organizing principle in the study of political leadership, informed by insights garnered from the cognitive revolution preceding the close of the twentieth century and
energized by the quickening evolutionary reconceptualization of personology at the dawn of the new millennium.
From Cognitive Revolution to Evolutionary Psychology
On the crest of major breakthroughs in evolutionary biology
during the preceding quarter-century, the emerging evolutionary perspective in psychology since the mid-1980s (see Buss,
1999; Millon, 1990; Millon, this volume) represents the ﬁrst
major theoretical shift in the discipline since the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Conceptually, the integrative
capacity of Millon’s (1990; Millon, this volume) evolutionary
model renders it sufﬁciently comprehensive to accommodate
major tenets of psychodynamic, behavioral, humanistic, interpersonal, cognitive, biogenic, and trait approaches to personality. Methodologically, Millon’s framework provides an
empirically validated taxonomy of personality patterns compatible with the syndromes described in DSM-IV, Axis II
(APA, 1994).
No present conceptual system in the ﬁeld of political
personality rivals Millon’s model in compatibility with conventional psychodiagnostic methods and standard clinical
practice in personality assessment. Moreover, no current system matches the elegance with which Millon’s evolutionary
model synthesizes normality and psychopathology. In short,
Millon offers a theoretically coherent alternative to existing
conceptual frameworks and assessment methodologies for
the psychological examination of political leaders (see Post,
2003, for an up-to-date collection of current conceptualizations; see Kinder, 1999, for a series of reviews, both critical
and laudatory, of “Millon’s evolving personality theories and
measures”).
The Utility of Millon’s Model as a Generative
Framework for the Study of Personality in Politics
The work of Millon (1990, 1994a, 1996, and his chapter in
this volume; Millon & Davis, 2000; Millon, Davis, & Millon,
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1996; Millon & Everly, 1985) provides a sound foundation
for conceptualizing and assessing political personality, classifying political personality types, and predicting political
behavior.
Epistemologically, it synthesizes the formerly disparate
ﬁelds of psychopathology and normatology and formally
connects them to broader spheres of scientiﬁc knowledge,
most notably their foundations in the natural sciences
(Millon, this volume). Diagnostically, it offers an empirically
validated taxonomy of personality patterns congruent with
the syndromes described on Axis II of DSM-IV (APA, 1994),
thus rendering it compatible with conventional psychodiagnostic procedures and standard clinical practice in personality assessment.
Millon (1986) uses the concept of the personality prototype
(paralleling the medical concept of the syndrome) as a global
formulation for construing and categorizing personality systems, proposing that “each personality prototype should comprise a small and distinct group of primary attributes that
persist over time and exhibit a high degree of consistency”
(p. 681). To Millon, the essence of personality categorization
is the differential identiﬁcation of these enduring (stable) and
pervasive (consistent) primary attributes. This position is consistent with the conventional view of personality in the study
of politics (see Knutson, 1973, pp. 29–38). In organizing his
attribute schema, Millon (1986) favors “an arrangement that
represents the personality system in a manner similar to that of
the body system, that is, dividing the components into structural and functional attributes” (p. 681; see Millon, 1990,
pp. 134–135, for a concise summary of these attribute
domains).

The Core Characteristics of a Comprehensive
Model of Personality in Politics
A comprehensive model for the study of personality in politics
(see Fig. 24.1) should account for structural and functional
personality attributes, at behavioral, phenomenological, intrapsychic, and biophysical levels of analysis; permit supplementary developmental causal analysis (i.e., genesis or
etiology); provide an explicit framework for risk analysis (i.e.,
account for normal variability as well as personality
pathology); and provide an assessment methodology. Furthermore, the personality model should be linked with performance outcomes, recognize the impact of situational variables
and the cultural context on political performance, and
allow for personological, situational, and contextual ﬁlters
that may modulate the impact of personality on political
performance.
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Developmental causal analysis
Biogenic factors
Experiential history
(Millon, 1996)

Structural personality attributes
Self-image
Object representations
Morphologic organization
Mood or temperament
(Millon, 1990, 1996)

Assessment

Functional personality attributes
Expressive behavior
Interpersonal conduct
Cognitive style
Regulatory mechanisms
(Millon, 1990, 1996)

Experiential filters
Training or expertise
Specific interests
(Hermann, 1978, 1980, 1987)

Strategic performance modalities
Existence: pain–pleasure
Adaptation: passive–active
Replication: other–self
Abstraction: cognitive
(Millon, 1990, 1994a, 1996)

Risk analysis

Tactical performance modalities
Biophysical
Behavioral
Phenomenological
Intrapsychic
(Millon, 1990, 1996)

Situational constraints
Historical antecedents
Immediate situation
(Smith, 1968, 1973)
Cultural context

Psychological political forecasting
Figure 24.1 A generative conceptual model for assessing personality and political
performance.

STRUCTURAL ATTRIBUTES OF PERSONALITY
Structural attributes, according to Millon (1990), “represent a
deeply embedded and relatively enduring template of imprinted memories, attitudes, needs, fears, conﬂicts, and so on,
which guide the experience and transform the nature of ongoing life events” (p. 147). Millon (1986, 1990) has speciﬁed
four structural attributes of personality, outlined in the following subsections. Where relevant, equivalent or compatible
formulations in the ﬁeld of political psychology are noted.
Self-Image
Self-image, located at the phenomenological level of analysis, denotes a person’s perception of self-as-object or the
manner in which people overtly describe themselves (Millon,
1986; 1990, pp. 148–149).

This domain accommodates self-conﬁdence, an element of
decision style in Hermann’s (1980, 1987) conceptual scheme.
It also offers an alternative theoretical basis for construing
Renshon’s (1996b) character domain of ambition, derived
from Kohut’s (1971, 1977) psychoanalytic self theory.
Object Representations
The domain of object representations, located at the phenomenological level of analysis, encompasses the inner imprint left
by a person’s signiﬁcant early experiences with others—in
other words, the structural residue of signiﬁcant past experiences, composed of memories, attitudes, and affects, which
serves as a substrate of dispositions for perceiving and responding to the social environment (Millon, 1986, 1990, p. 149).
This domain accommodates Renshon’s (1996b) character
attribute of relatedness, which is steeped in object-relations
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theory, including Kohut’s (1971) selfobject construct and
Karen Horney’s (1937) interpersonal tendencies.
Morphologic Organization
Morphologic organization, located at the intrapsychic level
of analysis, embodies the overall architecture that serves as
framework for a person’s psychic interior—the structural
strength, interior congruity, and functional efﬁcacy of the
personality system (Millon, 1986, 1990, pp. 149, 157).
This domain, roughly equivalent to the notion of ego
strength, provides a good ﬁt for Renshon’s (1996b) realm of
character integrity, derived from Kohut’s (1971) self theory
and elaborated in terms of Erikson’s (1980) notions of ego
identity and ego ideal.
Mood or Temperament
Mood or temperament, located at the biophysical level of
analysis, captures a person’s typical manner of displaying
emotion and the predominant character of an individual’s
affect, and the intensity and frequency with which he or she
expresses it (Millon, 1986, 1990, p. 157).
This domain provides a suitable ﬁt for Barber’s (1972/1992)
construal of presidential character along positive–negative
(i.e., affective) and active–passive (i.e., predisposition to activity, or temperamental) dimensions. In conjunction with the
domain of cognitive style, mood or temperament also provides
a conceptual frame of reference for the so-called pessimistic
explanatory style of stable (vs. unstable), global (vs. speciﬁc),
and internal (vs. external) causal attribution with respect to adversity, which, in combination with excessive rumination
about problems, has been shown to predict not only susceptibility to helplessness and depression, but the electoral defeat of
presidential candidates (Zullow & Seligman, 1990).

FUNCTIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF PERSONALITY
Functional attributes, according to Millon (1990), “represent
dynamic processes that transpire within the intrapsychic
world and between the individual’s self and psychosocial environment” (p. 136). Millon (1986, 1990) has speciﬁed four
functional attributes of personality, outlined in the next sections. Where relevant, equivalent or compatible formulations
in the ﬁeld of political psychology are noted.
Expressive Behavior
Expressive behavior, located at the behavioral level of analysis, refers to a person’s characteristic behavior—how the
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individual typically appears to others and what the individual
knowingly or unknowingly reveals about him- or herself or
wishes others to think or to know about him or her (Millon,
1986, 1990, p. 137).
Numerous personality traits commonly used to describe
political behavior are accommodated by this domain, including assertiveness, conﬁdence, competence, arrogance, suspiciousness, impulsiveness, prudence, and perfectionism.

Interpersonal Conduct
Interpersonal conduct, located at the behavioral level of
analysis, includes a person’s typical style of interacting with
others, the attitudes that underlie, prompt, and give shape to
these actions, the methods by which the individual engages
others to meet his or her needs, and the typical modes of coping with social tensions and conﬂicts (Millon, 1986, 1990,
pp. 137, 146).
This domain accommodates the personal political characteristic of interpersonal style in Hermann’s (1980, 1987) conceptual scheme, including its two operational elements,
distrust of others and task orientation. The domain of interpersonal conduct also offers a conceptual niche for Christie
and Geis’s (1970) operationalization of Machiavellianism,
which remains popular as a frame of reference for describing
political behavior.

Cognitive Style
Cognitive style, located at the phenomenological level of
analysis, signiﬁes a person’s characteristic manner of focusing
and allocating attention, encoding and processing information, organizing thoughts, making attributions, and communicating thoughts and ideas (Millon, 1986, 1990, p. 146).
This domain accommodates the personal political characteristics of beliefs and decision style in Hermann’s (1980,
1987) framework, most notably the conceptual complexity
component of decision style, and integrative complexity (e.g.,
Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock, 1985), which rose to
prominence during the Cold War era as a major construct for
operationalizing personality in politics. The domain of cognitive style is also compatible with the notions of nationalism
and belief in one’s own ability to control events (the two key
operational elements of beliefs in Hermann’s conceptual
framework) and her operationalization of several beliefs associated with contemporary reformulations of the operational
code construct (George, 1969; Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1990),
such as belief in the predictability of events and belief in the
inevitability of conﬂict.
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Regulatory Mechanisms
The domain of regulatory mechanisms, located at the intrapsychic level of analysis, involves a person’s characteristic
mechanisms of self-protection, need gratiﬁcation, and conﬂict resolution (Millon, 1986, 1990, pp. 146–147).
The need-gratiﬁcation facet of the regulatory mechanisms
domain provides a potential ﬁt for Winter’s (1973, 1987,
1991, 1998) approach to political personality, which emphasizes needs for power, achievement, and afﬁliation, and for
the related motives aspect of the personal characteristics component of Hermann’s (1980, 1987) conceptual scheme.

PERSONALITY DESCRIPTION, PSYCHOGENETIC
UNDERSTANDING, AND PREDICTIVE POWER
The practical value of conceptual systems for assessing personality in politics is proportionate to their predictive utility
in anticipating political behavior. Moreover, there is considerable merit in a personality model’s capacity to promote accurate understanding of the developmental antecedents of
political personality patterns.
Developmental Causal Analysis
The importance of a developmental component in a comprehensive model of personality is implicit in Millon and
Davis’s (2000) contention that, “once the subject has been
conceptualized in terms of personality prototypes of the classiﬁcation system, biographical information can be added”
to answer questions about the origin and development of the
subject’s personality characteristics (p. 73). Greenstein (1992)
cautions against “the fallacy of observing a pattern of behavior and simply attributing it to a particular developmental
pattern, without documenting causality, and perhaps even
without providing evidence that the pattern existed” (p. 121).
Millon (1996, chapter 3) frames developmental causal
analysis in terms of hypothesized biogenic factors and the
subject’s characteristic developmental history. For the majority of present-day personality-in-politics investigators, who
generally favor a descriptive approach to personality assessment, developmental questions are of secondary relevance;
however, an explicit set of developmental relational statements is invaluable for psychobiographically oriented analysis. Moreover, precisely because each personality pattern has
characteristic developmental antecedents, in-depth knowledge of a subject’s experiential history can be useful with respect to validating the results of descriptive personality

assessment, or for suggesting alternative hypotheses (Millon
& Davis, 2000, p. 74). This beneﬁt notwithstanding, genetic
reconstruction does not constitute an optimal basis for personality assessment and description.
A Framework for Risk Analysis
As Sears (1987) has noted, a problem with existing conceptualizations of personality in politics is the dichotomy between pathology-oriented and competence-oriented analyses.
Millon’s evolutionary theory of personality bridges the gap
by offering a uniﬁed view of normality and psychopathology:
“No sharp line divides normal from pathological behavior;
they are relative concepts representing arbitrary points on a
continuum or gradient” (Millon, 1994b, p. 283). The synthesis of normality and pathology is an aspect of Millon’s principle of syndromal continuity, which holds, in part, that
personality disorders are simply “exaggerated and pathologically distorted deviations emanating from a normal and
healthy distribution of traits” (Millon & Everly, 1985, p. 34).
Thus, whereas criteria for normality include “a capacity to
function autonomously and competently, a tendency to adjust
to one’s environment effectively and efﬁciently, a subjective
sense of contentment and satisfaction, and the ability to actualize or to fulﬁll one’s potentials” (Millon, 1994b, p. 283), the
presence of psychopathology is established by the degree to
which a person is deﬁcient, imbalanced, or conﬂicted in these
areas (Millon, this volume).
At base, then, Millon (1994b) regards pathology as resulting “from the same forces . . . involved in the development of
normal functioning . . ., [the determining inﬂuence being] the
character, timing, and intensity” (p. 283) of these factors (see
also Millon, 1996, pp. 12–13). From this perspective, risk
analysis would entail the classiﬁcation of individuals on a
range of dimensions, each representing a normal-pathological
continuum.
Despite the emphasis of Millon’s (1996) clinical model on
personality disorders, the absence of a conceptual distinction
between normal and abnormal personality—the assertion that
personality disorders are merely pathological distortions of
normal personality attributes (Millon, 1990; Millon & Everly,
1985)—his theoretical system is particularly well suited for
studying the implications of personality for political performance, because implicit in the principle of syndromal continuity is a built-in framework for risk analysis. In short,
Millon’s system offers an integrated framework for construing normal variability and personality pathology, and suggests
the likely nature and direction of personality decompensation
under conditions of catastrophic personality breakdown.
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Expert Ratings

Approaches to the indirect assessment of personality in politics can generally be classiﬁed into three categories: content
analysis, expert ratings, and psychodiagnostic analysis of
biographical data.

Paul Kowert (1996) has endeavored to move beyond the content-analytic methods (e.g., Hermann, 1980; Walker, 1990;
Winter, 1987) that dominated political personality inquiry
during the Cold War era, by applying Q-sort methodology to
single-case analysis. In view of the huge role of public opinion polling, focus groups, professional speech writers, and
political spin in contemporary politics, it seems prudent to
ﬁnd alternatives to speeches and interviews as primary
sources of data for psychological evaluation.
An important advantage of expert ratings is that it yields
coefﬁcients of interrater reliability. However, this is offset by
a variety of validity issues. Speciﬁcally, ratings by presidential scholars are fundamentally impressionistic and not based
on systematic personality assessment (see Etheredge, 1978,
p. 438). In some cases, high interrater reliability may merely
reﬂect a convergence of conventional wisdom and shared
myths about the personality characteristics of past presidents.
A major disadvantage of the expert-rating approach is that
it is uneconomical, cumbersome, and impractical. To gather
data for his study of the impact of personality on American
presidential leadership, Kowert (1996) solicited 42 experts
on American presidents. Rubenzer and his associates (2002),
for their ambitious, highly resourceful study of U.S. presidents (employing primarily Big Five personality measures),
attempted to contact nearly 1,000 biographers, presidential
scholars, journalists, and former White House ofﬁcials,
eventually securing the cooperation of 115 raters who collectively completed 172 assessment packets, each containing
620 items.
A vexing difﬁculty with expert ratings is that it is impractical for studying candidates in the heat of presidential campaigns, when—as noted by Renshon (1996b, chapter 13)—
accurate personality assessment is critical with respect to
assessing psychological suitability for ofﬁce. Historians and
presidential scholars are not optimal sources of information
under these conditions. Journalists who cover presidential candidates are potentially more reliable, but may be too immersed
in their own reporting to offer much assistance. A more practical approach would be to extract personality data directly from
the writings of journalists, presidential scholars, biographers,
and other experts, which obviates the need for soliciting their
active cooperation.

Content Analysis
The fundamental assumption of content-analytic techniques
for at-a-distance (i.e., indirect) measures “is that it is possible
to assess psychological characteristics of a leader by systematically analyzing what leaders say and how they say it”
(Schafer, 2000, p. 512). Content analysis remains the dominant approach to indirect personality assessment and is
widely acknowledged in political psychology as a reliable
data-analytic method. It draws on the assumptions and methods of psychology, political science, and speech communication (Schafer, 2000, p. 512) and predates the establishment of
political psychology as a discrete ﬁeld—having been used,
for example, to analyze Nazi propaganda during World
War II. Holsti’s (1977) classic overview of qualitative and
quantitative content-analytic approaches in political psychology remains relevant today, including his examination of
perennial validity concerns such as the logic of psychological
inferences about communicators engaging in persuasive
communication (pp. 133–134); the ambiguities of authorship
in documentary sources other than interviews and press conferences (p. 134); and problems of coding (e.g., word or symbol vs. theme or sentence coding) and data analysis (e.g.,
frequency vs. contingency measures; pp. 134–137). Paralleling advances in information technology, a recent development has been “automated content analysis” (Dille & Young,
2000), which “offers a less expensive, quicker, and more reliable alternative to commissioning graduate students to pore
over and content-analyze texts” (p. 595).
Schafer (2000) and Walker (2000) provide good overviews
of the current state of content-analytic at-a-distance assessment, its major conceptual and methodological issues, and
future research directions. Clearly, content analysis can be a
useful tool for dissecting political propaganda, examining psychologically relevant images in political rhetoric, and operationalizing important, politically relevant psychological
constructs such as motives and conceptual or integrative complexity. However, content analysis does not offer a congenial
frame of reference for comprehensive, clinically oriented psychological assessment procedures capable, in the words of
Millon and Davis (2000), of capturing the patterning of personality variables “across the entire matrix of the person” (p. 65).

Psychodiagnostic Analysis of Biographical Data
Simonton (1990) credits Lloyd Etheredge (1978) with establishing the diagnostic utility “of abstracting individual traits
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immediately from biographic data” to uncover the link between personality and political leadership (p. 677). Simonton
(1986) argues that “biographical materials [not only] . . . supply a rich set of facts about childhood experiences and career
development . . . [but] such secondary sources can offer the
basis for personality assessments as well” (p. 150).
Etheredge (1978) used a hybrid psychodiagnostic/expertrating approach. As subjects he selected 36 U.S. presidents,
secretaries of state, and presidential advisors who served between 1898 and 1968 and “assessed personality traits by
searching scholarly works, insiders’ accounts, biographies,
and autobiographies” of his subjects (p. 437). Speciﬁcally,
Etheredge excerpted passages relevant to two dimensions:
dominance–submission and introversion–extroversion. He
deleted explicit information and cues regarding the identity
of the political ﬁgures and then rated them on the two personality dimensions of interest, along with two independent
judges who were unaware of the subjects’ identities.
Etheredge (1978), in commenting on “troublesome
methodological issues” in such “second-hand assessment of
historical ﬁgures,” raises an important problem with respect
to atheoretical trait approaches to the study of personality:
A man like Secretary [John Foster] Dulles could be dominant over
his subordinates yet deferential to a superior. This social context
must be standardized explicitly. I chose to assess dominance by
assessing dominance over nominal subordinates on the assumption that a person’s inner desire to dominate would be less
inhibited and show itself more clearly in this sector of life. In addition, since America’s use of force has often been directed
against smaller countries, I felt this was the most relevant tendency of international behavior that would generalize. (p. 437)

Etheredge’s concerns highlight the indispensability of systematic import in personality-in-politics theorizing. Theorydriven conceptualization safeguards the psychodiagnostician
against several pitfalls in Etheredge’s reasoning. Most important, in spuriously identifying a problem where none in fact
existed, Etheredge introduced troubling confounds. The
pattern that Etheredge observed with respect to Secretary
Dulles transparently conveys a prototypical instance of the
distinctive interpersonal conduct of highly conscientious (or
compulsive) personalities. In stark contrast, highly dominant
personalities consistently assert themselves in relation to
both superiors and subordinates.
In lacking a prior personality taxonomy and proceeding
atheoretically, Etheredge missed an important, politically
relevant distinction with respect to dominance. Clearly, a
purely dimensional scale can obscure important distinctions
among disparate personality types. In short, dimensional

prominence provides a necessary but insufﬁcient basis for
personality assessment; it must be complemented by categorical distinctiveness—in other words, a comprehensive theory
of types.
This concern with categorical distinctiveness is reﬂected in
the work of Lyons (1997), who used the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI; Myers & McCaulley, 1985) as a frame of
reference for systematically extracting data from secondarysource biographies to construct a typological proﬁle of U.S.
president Bill Clinton, which he then used as a framework for
analyzing President Clinton’s leadership style. However, in
applying the Myers-Briggs model qualitatively, Lyons’s approach is somewhat impressionistic, lacking the empirical
basis essential for assessing dimensional prominence and the
nomothetic focus necessary for comparative study.
A noteworthy aspect of Lyons’s method is that he used one
set of biographies, predating Bill Clinton’s election as president, for extracting personality data and another set, focusing
on the Clinton presidency, for inferring leadership style (see
Lyons, 1997, p. 799). This is consistent with the solution
implied in Greenstein’s (1992) critique that
single-case and typological studies alike make inferences about
the inner quality of human beings . . . from outer manifestations—
their past and present environments . . . and the pattern over time
of their political responses. . . . They then use those inferred constructs to account for the same kind of phenomena from which
they were inferred—responses in situational contexts. The danger
of circularity is obvious, but tautology can be avoided by
reconstructing personality from some response patterns and using
the reconstruction to explain others. (pp. 120–121)

Greenstein’s point is valid insofar as it highlights the inherent danger of pseudoexplanations of leadership behaviors
in terms of mere diagnostic labels. However, Lyons’s approach seems overly reductionistic and risks reifying the
scientiﬁc method. At the operational level, it may be useful to
view personality as the independent variable and leadership
as the dependent variable—as if they were causally related.
Conceptually, however, the relationship is fundamentally correlational. The fallacy involved in construing personality and
leadership as hypothetical cause and effect, respectively, is
akin to the so-called third-variable problem in correlational
studies: Rather than manifest personality properties (x) causing observed leadership style (y), both variables likely
express a common latent structure (z); to paraphrase Millon
(1996), the “opaque or veiled inner traits” undergirding the
“surface reality” (p. 4) of both observed variables.
Millon’s system offers abundant prospects for psychodiagnostic analysis of biographical data. Several personality inventories have been developed to assess personality from a
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Millonian perspective. Best known among these is the widely
used Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory–III (MCMI-III;
Millon, Davis, & Millon, 1996), a standard clinical diagnostic tool employed worldwide. The Millon Index of Personality Styles (MIPS; Millon, 1994a) was developed to assess
and classify personality in nonclinical (e.g., corporate) settings. Similarly, Strack (1991) developed the Personality
Adjective Check List (PACL) for gauging normal personality
styles. Oldham and Morris, in their trade book, The New Personality Self-Portrait (1995), offer a self-administered instrument congruent with Millon’s model. Immelman (1999;
Immelman & Steinberg, 1999) adapted the Millon Inventory
of Diagnostic Criteria (MIDC) from Millon’s work, speciﬁcally for the assessment of personality in politics.
Immelman (1998, 2002) uses the MIDC to synthesize,
transform, and systematize diagnostically relevant information collected from the literature on political ﬁgures (primarily biographical sources and media reports) into Millon’s
(1990) four data levels (behavioral, phenomenological, intrapsychic, and biophysical). The next section outlines the
Millonian approach to political personality assessment.
A Theory-Driven Psychodiagnostic
Assessment Methodology
Favoring the more systematic, quantitative, nomothetic
approach advocated by Simonton (1986, 1988, 1990),
Immelman (1993, 1998, 2002) adapted Millon’s model of
personality (1986, 1990, 1994a, 1996; Millon & Davis, 2000;
Millon & Everly, 1985) for the indirect assessment of personality in politics. Immelman’s (1999) approach is equivalent to
Simonton’s (1986, 1988) in that it quantiﬁes, reduces, and organizes qualitative data extracted from the public record. It is
dedicated to quantitative measurement, but unlike the currently popular ﬁve-factor model, which is atheoretical, the
Millonian approach is theory driven. The assessment methodology yields a personality proﬁle derived from clinical analysis of diagnostically relevant content in biographical
materials and media reports, which provides an empirical
basis for predicting the subject’s political performance and
policy orientation (Immelman, 1998).
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career), inclusiveness of literary genre (e.g., biography, autobiography, scholarly analysis, and media reports), and the
writer’s perspective (e.g., a balance between admiring and
critical accounts).
Personality Inventory
Greenstein (1992) criticizes analysts who “categorize their
subjects without providing the detailed criteria and justiﬁcations for doing so” (p. 120). In Immelman’s (1999)
approach, the diagnostic criteria are documented by means of
a structured assessment instrument, the second edition of the
MIDC (Immelman & Steinberg, 1999), which was compiled
and adapted from Millon’s (1990, 1996; Millon & Everly,
1985) prototypal features and diagnostic criteria for normal
personality styles and their pathological variants. The justiﬁcation for classiﬁcation decisions is provided by documentation from independent biographical sources. The Millon
Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria Manual (Immelman, 1999)
describes the construction, administration, scoring, and interpretation of the MIDC. The 12 MIDC scales (see Immelman,
1999, 2002, for the full MIDC taxonomy) correspond to
major personality patterns posited by Millon (e.g., 1994a,
1996) and are coordinated with the normal personality styles
described by Oldham and Morris (1995) and Strack (1997).
Diagnostic Procedure
The diagnostic procedure can be summarized as a three-part
process: ﬁrst, an analysis phase (data collection) in which
source materials are reviewed and analyzed to extract and
code diagnostically relevant psychobiographical content;
second, a synthesis phase (scoring and interpretation) in
which the unifying framework provided by the MIDC prototypal features, keyed for attribute domain and personality
pattern, is employed to classify the diagnostically relevant information extracted in phase 1; and ﬁnally, an evaluation
phase (inference) in which theoretically grounded descriptions, explanations, inferences, and predictions are extrapolated from Millon’s theory of personality, based on the
personality proﬁle constructed in phase 2 (Immelman, 1998,
1999, 2002).

Sources of Data
Immelman (1998, 1999, 2002) gathers diagnostic information pertaining to the personal and public lives of political
ﬁgures from a variety of published materials, selected with a
view to securing broadly representative data sets. Pertinent
selection criteria include comprehensiveness of scope (e.g.,
coverage of developmental history as well as political

SITUATIONAL VARIABLES, EXPERIENTIAL
FILTERS, AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE
Greenstein (1992) cautions against “the psychologizing and
clinical fallacies” of explaining behavior in terms of personality while ignoring situational determinants (p. 121). This,
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of course, is simply the familiar fundamental attribution error
(Ross, 1977). Clearly, a comprehensive model of personality
in politics should account for the impact of situational variables and the cultural context on political performance and
recognize that certain personal characteristics (e.g., training
and experience) serve as ﬁlters for the political expression of
personality.
The best known integrative framework for political psychology is the conceptual map developed by M. Brewster
Smith (1968), which illustrates interactions among distal and
proximate social antecedents, the social environment, the immediate situation, personality processes and dispositions of
political actors, and political behavior. Smith’s conceptual
map has been exhaustively detailed in the political psychology literature and will not be recapitulated here. The reader is
referred to Smith (1968, 1973), Greenstein (1969, pp. 25–31;
cf. Greenstein’s 1992, pp. 114–116, reformulation), and
Stone and Schaffner (1988, pp. 32–43).
Filter Variables That Modulate the Impact
of Personality on Political Performance
An important aspect of Hermann’s (1980, 1987) model of
personality in politics is that it stipulates not only the conditions under which personal characteristics will most directly
inﬂuence political behavior (e.g., the wide decision latitude
of leaders in authoritarian regimes), but also speciﬁc ﬁlter
variables that modulate the impact of personality on political
performance. A high-level political leader’s training, experience, or expertise has “a dampening effect” on the impact of
personal characteristics on government behavior because it
increases the range or repertoire of policy-relevant, rolerelated behaviors available to the leader (Hermann, 1987,
p. 166). Sensitivity to the environment similarly inhibits the
impact of personality in politics. According to Hermann
(1987), “the more sensitive the leader is to cues from his political environment, the more likely other types of factors are
to intervene in this relationship” (p. 166). Hermann’s employment of this particular variable as a ﬁlter is problematic
in that social responsiveness is in essence a personality trait.
Finally, interest in foreign affairs (or in any aspect of politics
for that matter, depending on the political domain of interest)
“acts as a motivating force” (Hermann, 1980, p. 13); it
“enhances the effect of a leader’s [personal] orientation on
government policy” by increasing his or her participation in
the decision-making process and restricting the delegation of
authority in the political domain of interest (Hermann, 1987,
p. 166).
It is worth noting that Renshon’s construal of “skills and
talents” that mediate the relationship between character and

political performance (see Renshon, 1996a, p. 47; 1996b,
pp. 194–199), stripped of its surplus Kohutian self-psychological signiﬁcance, is not incompatible with Hermann’s notion of experiential ﬁlters.
Systematic Import in a Generative Theory of
Personality and Political Performance
In his introduction to a special issue of the journal Leadership
Quarterly devoted to political leadership, guest editor Dean
Keith Simonton (1998) asserted that “political leadership has
received inadequate attention by researchers who specialize
in the study of leadership” (p. 239). To highlight the disproportionate focus of leadership research on small problemsolving groups, Simonton noted that a recent edition of the
classic Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership (Bass,
1990) dispensed with the topic of political leadership in only
four pages.
Hermann (1986) demarcated the requisite scope of inquiry
by specifying ﬁve ingredients necessary for understanding
political leadership:
(1) the leader’s personality and background, as well as the [leadership] recruitment process . . .; (2) the characteristics of
the groups and individuals whom the leader is leading; (3) the
nature of the relationship between the leader and those he leads;
(4) the context or setting in which the leadership is taking place;
and (5) the outcomes of interactions between the leader and
those led in speciﬁc situations. (p. 169)

Clearly, Hermann accords personality a prominent place
in the study of political leadership. She elaborates by specifying seven personal characteristics that inﬂuence political
leadership: (a) the leader’s basic political beliefs, which inﬂuence “the kinds of goals and strategies the leader will urge
on his [or her] political unit”; (b) the leader’s political style,
which contributes to the structure and function of the political unit; (c) the leader’s motivation for seeking a political
leadership position, which shapes “the general focus of attention of the leader’s behavior”; (d) the leader’s reaction to
stress and pressure, which has a bearing on the kinds of issues prone “to cause problems for the leader and how detrimental and pervasive stress is likely to be”; (e) the manner
in which the leader was ﬁrst recruited into a political leadership position, which is instrumental in determining “how
free of political debts and obligations” he or she will be and
predicts “the rhetoric and practices” that the leader will tend
to revert to; (f) the leader’s previous political experience,
which signiﬁes how qualiﬁed he or she is for the position
and “what strategies and styles have paid off for the leader”
over time; and (g) the unique generational experiences of the
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leader upon embarking on a political career, in terms of the
prevailing political climate that helped “shape the norms and
beliefs” of the leader and his or her constituents (pp. 173–
180).
Developing a comprehensive model of political leadership
is beyond the scope of the present endeavor, which is dedicated primarily to mapping out a generative conceptual
framework and methodology for studying personality in politics. Nonetheless, there is heuristic value in broadly stipulating the major tenets for an evolving theory of political
leadership synergistically superimposed upon a comprehensive, generative model of personality in politics. Of central
relevance in this regard are Hermann’s (1986) ﬁrst two
personal characteristics surmised to inﬂuence political leadership: political beliefs impinging on a leader’s goals or
strategies, and stylistic elements that fashion the structural
and functional attributes of political units. These core characteristics are important signposts for a generative theory of
personality and political performance compliant with
Hempel’s (1965) canon of systematic import.
To this end, Millon’s evolutionary model of personality
provides a practical point of departure. David Buss (1999)
has bluntly asserted that “theories of personality inconsistent
with evolutionary principles stand little or no chance of
being correct” (p. 52). Paralleling Millon’s (1996, chapter 5)
construal of a personologically based evolutionary model
of psychotherapeutic intervention, an applied personologic
model of leadership can be construed as encompassing both
strategic and tactical modalities. From this frame of reference, strategic dimensions of political leadership would
consist of generalized, personality-based leadership orientations, including higher-order political aims and long-term
policy goals and preferences, whereas tactical (stylistic)
modalities of political leadership would consist of more concrete, focal leadership objectives and political maneuvers,
typically dictated by circumstances but shaped both by the
leader’s underlying structural and functional personality
attributes and by his or her higher order strategic aims and
goals. The distinction between strategic and tactical modalities of political performance is equivalent to the distinction
between philosophical and instrumental beliefs in George’s
(1969) operational code construct. Philosophical (epistemological) beliefs include a leader’s “assumptions and
premises” about “the fundamental nature of politics” and
“the nature of political conﬂict,” whereas instrumental
beliefs relate to “ends–means relationships in the context of
political action” (p. 199). When reconceptualized in evolutionary terms, this general perspective provides a heuristic
basis for an emergent personological interpretation of
political performance.
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AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF PERSONALITY
AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE:
THE STRATEGIC MODALITIES
Paralleling the conceptual foundations of his personological
model, Millon’s (1996, chapter 5) strategic modalities of applied psychological intervention are derived from three universal, interacting domains or spheres of evolutionary and
ecological principles (1990; Millon, this volume): existence
(the pain–pleasure polarity), adaptation (the passive–active
polarity), and replication (the other–self polarity). A practical
operationalization of these three polarities is provided by the
Millon Index of Personality Styles (MIPS; Millon, 1994a;
cf. Millon, this volume), which assesses them in accordance
with six “motivating aims”: life enhancement (pleasure seeking) versus life preservation (pain avoidance), ecologic modiﬁcation (active) versus ecologic accommodation (passive),
and reproductive propagation (self-individuating) versus
reproductive nurturance (other-nurturing).
The MIPS also assesses four “cognitive modes,” or
predilections of abstraction, consonant with Carl Jung’s
(1921/1971) theory of types. Unlike the three universal motivating aims, the cognitive modes represent a distinctly
human sphere of functioning and were thus redundant with
respect to deriving Millon’s (1990, 1996) original taxonomy
of adaptive and maladaptive personality styles from evolutionary ecology. However, precisely by virtue of the fact that
abstraction “concerns the emergence of uniquely human
competencies that foster anticipatory planning and reasoned
decision making” (Millon, 1999, pp. 442–443; Millon, this
volume), the cognitive modes are critical with respect to
deducing a synergistic, personological model of political performance. Moreover, the four distinctly human cognitive
propensities will likely be at the forefront of future advances
in Millon’s personality system, judging from his current conviction that predilections of abstraction, the most recent stage
of evolution, comprise “central elements in personologic
derivations” (Millon, this volume).
It is noteworthy that in terms of evolutionary theory,
Osgood’s (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) three semantic differential dimensions, namely evaluation (good–bad),
potency (strong–weak), and activity (active–passive), can
be conceptually linked to, respectively, Millon’s (1990)
pleasure–pain, self–other, and active–passive polarities.
Aims of Existence: The Pain–Pleasure Polarity
The two-dimensional (i.e., two linearly independent vectors)
pain–pleasure polarity (Millon, 1990, pp. 51–64; Millon, this
volume) is conceptualized in terms of, respectively, life
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enhancement (pleasure seeking) and life preservation (pain
avoidance): “acts that are ‘attracted’ to what we experientially record as ‘pleasurable’ events (positive reinforcers) . . .
[versus] behaviors oriented to ‘repel’ events experientially
characterized as ‘painful’ (negative reinforcers)” (Millon,
this volume).
Hypothetically, the pain–pleasure polarity could partially
account for individual differences in ideological (e.g.,
liberal–conservative) resonance in politics. In evolutionary
terms, liberalism can be construed as a primary concern
“with improvement in the quality of life” and “behaviors that
improve survival chances,” and conservatism as an avoidance of “actions or environments that threaten to jeopardize
survival” (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 58). Thus construed,
liberals seek to maximize survival by seeking pleasure (life
enhancement, or positive reinforcement), whereas conservatives seek to maximize survival by avoiding pain (life preservation, or negative reinforcement).
The nature of the relationship between personality and ideology has been a perennial concern in political psychology
and remains a topic worthy of study. As early as 1907, William
James drew a personological distinction between two ideologically relevant philosophical temperaments: optimistic,
idealistic tender-mindedness versus pessimistic, materialistic
tough-mindedness—a position compatible with Millon’s
(1990) life-enhancement and life-preservation polarities.
Evolutionary theory also may shed new light on an unresolved controversy in political psychology, namely the debate over authoritarianism as fundamentally a right-wing
phenomenon versus authoritarianism as an expression of
both right-wing and left-wing ideological extremism.
Eysenck (1954) proposed a two-factor theory that among its
classiﬁcations conceptualized fascists as tough-minded conservatives, communists as tough-minded radicals, and liberals as tender-minded moderates. Paul Sniderman (1975)
conjectured that low self-esteem encourages both left-wing
and right-wing extremism. More consonant with Millon’s
pain–pleasure polarity, Silvan Tomkins’s (1963) polarity
theory posits that people with more humanistic, left-wing,
ideo-affective postures (or scripts) both express and are more
receptive to positive affect, whereas those with more normative, right-wing scripts tend to be more responsive to negative affect. Stone (1980; Stone & Smith, 1993), a leading
critic of what he calls the myth of left-wing authoritarianism,
has argued on empirical grounds that the evidence for leftwing authoritarianism is ﬂawed (see Altemeyer, 1996;
McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina, 1993) and that authoritarianism is, in essence, a right-wing phenomenon.
In Hermann’s conceptual scheme, a core belief component shaping a leader’s worldview is nationalism, which
emphasizes “the importance of maintaining national honor

and dignity” (Hermann, 1987, p. 167). In Millon’s evolutionary terms, the motivating aim of nationalism clearly is a lifepreserving (pain-avoidant) orientation.
The pain–pleasure dimension also provides evolutionary
underpinnings for Barber’s (1972/1992) fourfold (active–
passive × positive–negative) categorization of presidential
character, in which positivity–negativity is described in terms
of enjoyment derived from political ofﬁce. Positive leaders
have a generally optimistic outlook and derive pleasure from
the duties of public ofﬁce, whereas negative leadership has a
more pessimistic tone, being oriented toward pain aversion.
Finally, the pain–pleasure dimension suggests a possible
evolutionary basis for the three management models proposed by Johnson (1974) and employed by George and Stern
(1998) to classify the policy-making structures and advisory
systems favored by recent U.S. presidents.
Formalistic chief executives prefer “an orderly policymaking [sic] structure, . . . well-deﬁned procedures, hierarchical lines of communication, and a structured staff system”
(George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, they
seek to preserve life by minimizing pain.
Competitive chief executives encourage “more open and
uninhibited expression of diverse opinions, analysis, and advice” and tolerate or encourage “organizational ambiguity,
overlapping jurisdictions, and multiple channels of communication to and from the president” (George & Stern, 1998,
p. 203). In evolutionary terms, they seek to enhance life by
maximizing pleasure.
Collegial chief executives attempt to beneﬁt from the advantages of both the competitive and formalistic approaches
while avoiding their pitfalls. Thus, they strive for “diversity
and competition in the policymaking system,” balanced by
“encouraging cabinet ofﬁcers and advisers to identify at least
partly with the presidential perspective” and “encouraging
collegial participation” (George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In
evolutionary terms, collegial executives are intermediate on
both the pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant polarities.
The systematic import of a generative theory is implicit
in the suggestion that Johnson’s (1974) management model
fails to account for at least two additional executive styles: complex types high on both the pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant
polarities, and undifferentiated types low on both valences.
Modes of Adaptation: The Passive–Active Polarity
The passive–active polarity (Millon, 1990, pp. 64–77; Millon,
this volume) is conceptualized in terms of ecologic modiﬁcation (active) and ecologic accommodation (passive); that is,
“whether initiative is taken in altering and shaping life’s
events or whether behaviors are reactive to and accommodate
those events” (Millon, this volume).
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The passive–active dimension provides evolutionary underpinnings for Barber’s (1972/1992) fourfold (active–passive
× positive–negative) categorization of presidential character,
in which activity–passivity is described in terms of energy invested in political ofﬁce. In evolutionary terms, a passive
orientation can be construed as “a tendency to accommodate to
a given ecological niche and accept what the environment
offers,” whereas an active orientation can be construed as “a
tendency to modify or intervene in the environment, thereby
adapting it to oneself” (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 59).
The passive–active dimension also provides an evolutionary basis for Etheredge’s (1978) fourfold (high–low
dominance × introversion–extroversion) classiﬁcation of
personality-based differences in foreign-policy operating
style and role orientation. High-dominance introverts (bloc
or excluding leaders such as Woodrow Wilson and Herbert
Hoover) actively seek to reshape the world, typically by
means of containment policies or by tenaciously advancing
a personal vision. High-dominance extraverts (world or
integrating leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson) actively seek to reshape the world through advocacy and pragmatic leadership on a wide range of foreign-policy fronts.
Low-dominance introverts (maintainers such as Calvin
Coolidge) tend to persevere with the existing order, passively pursuing a foreign policy that amounts to “a holding
action for the status quo.” Low-dominance extraverts (conciliators such as William McKinley, William Taft, Warren
Harding, Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower),
though revealing a preference for accommodating to existing arrangements, are more ﬂexible and open to change,
tending “to respond to circumstances with the sympathetic
hope that accommodations can be negotiated” (Etheredge,
1978, pp. 449–450).
Finally, in Hermann’s (1980, 1987) conceptual scheme, a
core belief contributing to a leader’s worldview, along with
nationalism, is belief in one’s own ability to control events. In
evolutionary terms, a more efﬁcacy-oriented, internal locus
of control implies an active-modifying motivating aim, in
contrast to a more external locus of control, which suggests a
passive-accommodating mode of adaptation. Hermann’s
(1987) expansionist, active-independent, and inﬂuential orientations are more actively oriented, whereas her mediatorintegrator, opportunist, and developmental orientations are
more passively oriented.
Strategies of Replication: The Other–Self Polarity
The other–self polarity (Millon, 1990, pp. 77–98) is conceptualized in terms of, respectively, reproductive nurturance (other)
and reproductive propagation (self): a nurturing tendency to
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value the needs of others versus an individuating selforientation that seeks to realize personal potentials before attending to the needs of others (Millon, 1994a, p. 6; Millon, this
volume).
In political psychology, three social motives (which in
Hermann’s conceptual scheme are postulated to contribute to
a leader’s worldview) are regarded as playing a key role in
leader performance: need for power, need for achievement,
and need for afﬁliation (Winter, 1987, 1998). In evolutionary
terms, the need for power, involving “the desire to control,
inﬂuence, or have an impact on other persons or groups”
(Hermann, 1987, p. 167), suggests a self-individuating replicating strategy, as does the need for achievement, which
involves “a concern for excellence” and personal accomplishment (Winter, 1998, p. 369). Conversely, the need for
afﬁliation, reﬂecting “concern for establishing, maintaining,
or restoring warm and friendly relations with other persons or
groups” (Hermann, 1987, p. 167), suggests an other-nurturing
replicating strategy. Hermann’s (1987) expansionist, activeindependent, and inﬂuential orientations are more selforiented, whereas her mediator-integrator, opportunist, and
developmental orientations are more other-oriented.
Hermann (1980) also posits two key elements of interpersonal style that, in conjunction with decision style, shape a
leader’s personal political style: distrust of others and task
orientation (see Hermann, 1987, pp. 163, 167). In evolutionary terms, the trust–distrust and task–relationship dimensions of leadership are easily reconceptualized as surface
manifestations of the other–self bipolarity.
The two key elements of decision style in Hermann’s (1980)
framework are conceptual complexity and self-conﬁdence,
which she construes (following Ziller, Stone, Jackson, &
Terbovic, 1977), as jointly determinative of “how ideological
or pragmatic a political leader will be” (Hermann, 1987,
p. 164). Ziller (1973) developed a social-psychological theory
of personality that examines two components of the selfconcept—self-esteem and complexity of the self-concept—in
the context of responsiveness to the views of others. Ziller et al.
(1977) conducted a series of important studies investigating
the effects of the four self–other orientations (high/low selfesteem × high/low self-complexity) on political behavior.
They found that, in terms of political behavior, persons with
high self-esteem and high self-complexity (apoliticals) “have
difﬁculty being responsive” to others; persons with low selfesteem and high self-complexity (pragmatists) “are quite responsive” to the opinions of others; persons with high
self-esteem and low self-complexity (ideologues) “are generally nonresponsive” to the opinions of others; and persons with
low self-esteem and low self-complexity (an indeterminate
type) “are highly responsive within a narrow range of social
stimuli” (Ziller et al., 1977, pp. 179–180). According to Ziller
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and his coworkers, low self-esteem/high self-complexity pragmatists and high self-esteem–low self-complexity ideologues
“parallel the two leadership roles which have been observed in
small groups, the task role (ideologue) and the socio-emotional
role (pragmatist)” (p. 193).
Stone and Baril (1979), elaborating on the ﬁndings of
Ziller et al. (1977), used self–other orientation as a conceptual basis for postulating two distinctive political prototypes,
each having a different motivational base. The pragmatist—
akin to Barber’s (1965) active-negative advertiser—is motivated by power seeking to compensate for low self-esteem
(as anticipated by Lasswell, 1948), being driven by selfenhancement and self-promotion. The second political personality type, the ideologue—akin to Barber’s (1965)
active-positive lawmaker—is more other oriented, apparently having a sincere interest in good legislation (deﬁned
as either pursuing ideological goals or as serving a
constituency).
Stone and Baril’s (1979) construal of self- and otheroriented political personality types, in concert with Barber’s
(1965, 1972/1992) scheme, lends empirical and theoretical
support for the utility of Millon’s (1990) other–self polarity
in an overarching theory of political personality and performance. In addition, Ziller et al.’s (1977) explication of four
self–other orientations in relation to social responsiveness
offers a conceptual substrate for Hermann’s (1980, 1987)
notion of “sensitivity to the [political] environment” as a ﬁlter for modulating the inﬂuence of personal characteristics on
political behavior.
Predilections of Abstraction: The Cognitive Polarities
The cognitive modes of abstraction (Millon, 1990, pp. 42–43,
1994a, pp. 3–4, 6–7, 21–27), which encompass “the sources
employed to gather knowledge about the experience of life and
the manner in which this information is gathered and transformed” (Millon, this volume), are conceptualized in terms of
four polarities subserving two superordinate functions,
namely information sourcing and transformational processing of cognitive data:
1. The external–internal orientation polarity involves extraceptive (extraversing) versus intraceptive (introversing)
modes of information gathering or knowledge sourcing.
2. The tangible–intangible disposition polarity entails realistic (sensory, concrete) versus intuitive (abstract) modes of
attending to, selecting, and perceiving information.
3. The ideational–emotional preference polarity pertains to
intellective (thinking) versus affective (feeling) modes of
information processing.

4. The integrating–innovative bias polarity relates to assimilative (systematizing) versus imaginative (innovating)
modes of knowledge transformation; that is, knowledge
assimilation versus cognitive accommodation.
Implicitly, Choiniere and Keirsey (1992) cross the
tangible–intangible cognitive mode with the other–self motivating aim to yield a fourfold (realistic, concrete vs. intuitive,
abstract mode of thought and speech  moral sanctioning vs.
pragmatic utilitarian value orientation) categorization of U.S.
presidents as Guardians (concrete sanctioners), Idealists
(abstract sanctioners), Artisans (concrete utilitarians), and Rationals (abstract utilitarians; pp. 8–10; see also pp. 598–602).
Furthermore, Choiniere and Keirsey’s (1992) model of “presidential temperament” distinguishes two variants of each
type—directing and reporting (pp. 11–12)—a distinction that
appears to be a surface manifestation of Millon’s (1990)
active–passive polarity. Thus, when reconceptualized in terms
of Millon’s (1994a) three universal evolutionary motivating
aims and four cognitive modes, there are eight distinct leadership styles: active-realist utilitarians (Operator Artisans such
as Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F.
Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson); passive-realist utilitarians
(Player Artisans such as Warren Harding and Ronald Reagan);
active-intuitive utilitarians (Organizer Rationals such as
Herbert Hoover and Dwight D. Eisenhower); passive-intuitive
utilitarians (Engineer Rationals such as Thomas Jefferson
and Abraham Lincoln); active-realist sanctioners (Monitor
Guardians such as George Washington, Woodrow Wilson,
Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, Jimmy Carter, and Richard
Nixon); passive-realist sanctioners (Conservator Guardians
such as William McKinley, William Taft, Gerald Ford, and
George H. W. Bush); active-intuitive sanctioners (Mentor
Idealists); and passive-intuitive sanctioners (Advocate Idealists). There have been no Idealist U.S. presidents; however,
Choiniere and Keirsey (1992) present Mohandas Gandhi and
Eleanor Roosevelt as prototypes of, respectively, the Mentor
and Advocate Idealist.

AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF PERSONALITY
AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE:
THE TACTICAL MODALITIES
Millon’s (1996, chapter 5) tactical modalities of applied psychological intervention are conceptually anchored to his
eight structural and functional personality domains, encompassing the behavioral, phenomenological, intrapsychic, and
biophysical levels of analysis. Millon (1996) notes that the
eight domains “are not themselves the parts of personality,
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but do serve as a means of classifying the parts or constructs
of personality” (p. 183). There is heuristic value in employing a parallel organizational scheme to classify the constructs
of political performance (leadership and decision making).
At a minimum, such a heuristic model establishes explicit
links between the source domain of personality and the target
domain of political performance.
Biophysical Level
Fundamentally, Barber’s (1972/1992) dimensions of activity–
passivity and positive affect/negative affect constitute a
temperamental (i.e., having a predisposition to activity and
emotionality) construct. Thus, Barber’s construal of “presidential character” offers a congenial framework for deducing
biophysical (temperamental and affective) modalities of
presidential performance.
The biophysical modality also is capable of accommodating the notion of emotional intelligence, one of the six key
qualities in Greenstein’s (2000) schema for describing presidential leadership style and job performance. The ﬂawed
presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy
Carter, and Bill Clinton all serve as stark reminders of the
pernicious effects that failed emotional management can
have on presidential performance. More signiﬁcant, however,
is that this modality offers a congenial framework for accommodating the emerging biopolitical perspective (e.g.,
Marcus, 2001; Masters, 1989) on the psychology of politics.
Behavioral Level
The ubiquitous task–relationship dimension, prevalent in contemporary theories of leadership (including that of Hermann,
1986), presents a clear-cut instance of a personality-based
leadership orientation observed at the behavioral level. The
behavioral modality also represents the appropriate data level
for assessing Renshon’s (1996b) “three distinct aspects of
presidential and political leadership: mobilization, orchestration, and consolidation” (p. 226). Three of Greenstein’s (2000)
six stylistic and performance qualities can be assembled at the
behavioral level of analysis: organizational capacity, effectiveness as a public communicator, and political skill.
Phenomenological Level
Numerous personality-based leadership traits and qualities
converge on the phenomenological data level, including conceptual complexity (Hermann, 1974, 1987), integrative complexity (Suedfeld, 1994), cognitive style (George & Stern,
1998), sense of efﬁcacy and competence (George & Stern,
1998), and judgment/decision making (Renshon, 1996b).
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Two of Greenstein’s (2000) presidential leadership and performance qualities, namely vision (which subsumes both the
power to inspire and consistency of viewpoint) and cognitive
style, assemble at this data level.
Intrapsychic Level
Both Hermann’s (1987) trust–distrust dimension (a component of interpersonal style) and George and Stern’s (1998)
orientation toward political conﬂict (which inﬂuences a
leader’s choice of policy-making system) lend themselves to
analysis at the intrapsychic data level. Indeed, numerous personological and social-psychological perspectives relevant to
political leadership, judgment, and decision making converge
at the intrapsychic level, including the ego-defensive notion
of scapegoating as a form of displaced aggression (Adorno
et al., 1950; Hovland & Sears, 1940); the belief in a just
world and blaming the victim (Lerner, 1970) as a form of defensive attribution; and the problem of defensive avoidance
in political decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977). The intrapsychic modality also offers a heuristic frame of reference
for examining psychodynamic aspects of xenophobia, ethnic
hatred, and the so-called roots of evil (Staub, 1989) as expressed in political leadership.
CONCLUSION
Political psychologists recognize that political outcomes are
governed by a multitude of factors, many of them indeterminate. Nonetheless, the study of personality in politics has
advanced sufﬁciently to permit broad personality-based performance predictions and to pinpoint a political candidate’s
speciﬁc strengths and limitations.
A coherent psychodiagnostic framework capable of capturing the critical personological determinants of political
performance, embedded in a broad range of attribute domains
across the entire matrix of the person—not just the individual’s motives, operational code, integrative complexity, or
personality traits—is the one indispensable tool without
which the assessment of personality in politics can neither
prevail nor prosper.
Although this chapter has but scratched the surface in
breaking new ground for the construction of a generative,
evolutionary foundation for personality-in-politics inquiry, I
join Theodore Millon (coeditor of this volume) in reﬂecting
as he did upon concluding his epoch-making Toward a New
Personology: An Evolutionary Model (1990):
Some may very well argue they just struggled through an author’s need not only to impose an unnecessary order but to frame
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its elements in an overly formalistic sequence; that I, the author,
have forced the subject of personology into the procrustean bed
of theoretical predilections, drawing on tangential topics of little
or no relevance. If such a case be valid, I regret that my habit of
seeking bridges between scientiﬁc domains has led me to cohere
subjects best left disparate. It is hoped that this philosophic prejudice, obviously inspired by a personally driven world view, will
yet prove to have a modicum of empirical merit and theoretical
value. (p. 177)
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